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Failure and Forgiveness: A Review
by
James J. White*
In Failure and Forgiveness,' Professor Karen Gross has written two books
about bankruptcy. The first book, found in the first nine chapters, describes
the bankruptcy law, the bankruptcy system, its operation, and the policies
that support that law and system. This first book is written for a lay audience, and it is an admirable exposition of the law and policy. The second
book, chapters ten to fifteen, contains several proposals for change in the
bankruptcy law and states arguments to justify those proposals. The second
book shows Professor Gross to be a kindly socialist, deeply suspicious of free
markets and modern economic man, and quite willing to distribute the
debtor's assets in bankruptcy according to the claimants' needs, not according
to their deserts.2 This second book is written for bankruptcy professionals.
Since Failure and Forgiveness was published by an academic press, it is unlikely ever to be seen by the lay public who could profit from the first book;
unfortunately its audience will be limited to academics and a few bankruptcy
practitioners who will not greatly profit from the second book.
In my opinion most of the suggestions in chapters ten to fifteen for modifications in the American bankruptcy law are wrong-headed, and they are not
saved by Professor Gross' concession that some of her "proposed solutions
can be viewed as impractical based on logistical and political realities." 3 Some
of these "logistical and political realities" rest on sound footings, a point that
Professor Gross should have considered.
I limit my discussion to two proposals that are contained in the last half
of Professor Gross' book. The first is a suggestion that the Chapter 11 process should be opened up to consider the interests of certain "communities,"
defined as interested parties who do not have claims and therefore are not
creditors. 4 Professor Gross' most radical suggestion is to give those communities a voice somehow, perhaps with some real power in the typical Chapter
11 case and its proceedings. Second, I discuss her proposal to grant special
*Robert A. Sullivan Professor, University of Michigan Law School. I thank Robert Waldner, class of
2000, for research and my colleagues Cynthia Baker and Ronald Mann for their suggestions.
'KAREN GROSS, FAILURE AND FORaIVENESS: REBALANCING THE BANKRUPTcY SYSTEM (1997).
See, e.g., id. at 155 (1997) (describing the priority enjoyed by secured creditors as "one of the more
problematic" priorities).
2

'Id. at 3.
4
See id. at 193.
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priority to certain unsecured creditors who can show that the conventional
5
pro rata distribution causes them "irreparable injury."
Years ago when Tom Hayden's political party was in control of the City
Council of Santa Monica, California, one of his followers proposed a solution
for Santa Monica's homeless problem. Recognizing that many citizens of
Santa Monica had empty bedrooms because their children had moved away
or because they had bought a house bigger than they needed, and understanding that there were hundreds of homeless people in Santa Monica, this person
proposed a law that would require a resident with extra bedrooms to rent
those bedrooms (presumably for rent to be paid by the City Council) to the
homeless. Those refusing to rent their spare rooms would suffer a penalty in
the form of increased taxes or the like. So with the stroke of the pen Tom
and his friends would both alleviate an important social problem-beds for
the homeless-and put to good use a wasted asset-empty bedrooms in citizens' homes. Some of Professor Gross' proposals for the Bankruptcy Code
remind me of Tom Hayden's homeless solution. Like his, her proposals have
an ingenuous appeal. Regrettably her proposals share other characteristics of
the homeless suggestion; they are likely to be adopted only when hell freezes
over and, like Hayden's proposal, Professor Gross' suggestions omit consideration of many practical and political-not to say moral -difficulties inherent
in the proposal.
I. EMPOWERING "COMMUNITIES"
According to Professor Gross the Chapter 11 process should take account of the interests of relevant "communities." Once status as a "community" has been established, Professor Gross suggests no restrictions on its
rights. While she ignores the details (for example, will the community have a
right to vote on a plan?), it appears that she anticipates a role in the reorganization process for communities similar to the role that any creditor would
6
have.
Like the proponent of the homeless ordinance, Professor Gross makes several points concerning her proposal that are irrefutable. First she notes that
certain "communities" are already represented and are given particular and
unique status by the Bankruptcy Code. Among these for example, are employees, retirees, and persons injured by drunk drivers.7 In the railroad reor5

See id. at 165.
See id. at 228-29 (discussing communities' roles in confirmation process).
7
See 11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(3)(A) (1994) (giving priority to wages, salaries, sick leave, and vacation leave
earned within 90 days of filing of petition or cessation of business, up to $4,000 per employee); id.
§ 507(a)(4) (giving priority to other benefits earned within 180 days of filing); id. § 11 14(e)(2) (giving
priority to retirement benefits); id. § 523(a)(9) (making debts arising from drunk driving nondischargeable).
Note that all of these favored groups are creditors.
6
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ganization cases the interests of communities that might be injured by
liquidation of the railroad are recognized.8 She notes too that some creditors
are so favored that their claims are not discharged in bankruptcy.9
But of course she gives no satisfactory explanation of the characteristics
of these persons who are entitled to special status,10 and she overlooks the
possibility that the railroad reorganizations ought to be regarded as a model
to be abhorred, not to be emulated." She also ignores the limited success
that "communities" have had in getting the Congress or the state legislatures
to protect their interests.' 2 She fails to note that the preferences granted to
favored classes by current bankruptcy law are quite limited.3
Professor Gross is right in stating that a Chapter 11 case can have a large
and direct impact on persons who are not technically creditors and who
therefore have no standing to take part in the Chapter 11 proceedings under
the current law. Recognizing that injury might occur to taxing agencies, customers and suppliers of a debtor and to other users of a debtor's services is
one thing. Saying that those persons have sufficiently substantial interests to
be treated as though they were creditors is another.
How would Professor Gross' proposals change the Chapter 11 process?
With an optimism that makes Pangloss look dour, Professor Gross visualizes a
bankruptcy love fest where her "communities" appear and convince the
debtor and all creditors to accept their positions. In her proposed world
these requests are logical, consistent with one another and always reasonable.
They never burden the process; they always improve the product.
One could take a less optimistic view of her proposal. First is the possibility that vigilant bankruptcy judges, hostile to the idea of "communities"
growing up in their courtroom, will pinch off all "communities" in the bud.
Under Professor Gross' proposal, judges could do so by finding that those
SSee GRoss, supra note 1, at 219-20; 11 U.S.C. § 1161-74 (1994 & Supp. 1997) (special subchapter for
railroad organization); id. § 1170(a)(2) (stating that the railroad lines can only be abandoned if it is consistent with the public interest); id. § 1173(a)(4) (1994) (stating that railroad reorganization plan can only be
confirmed if consistent with public interest). See also Reorganization of Railroads Engaged in Interstate
Commerce, Pub. L. No. 72-420, 47 Stat. 1474 (1933) (governing railroad insolvency prior to 1978).
9
See GRoss, supra note 1, at 27.
"°Seeid. at 158 C'[T]he justifications for differing treatment under the current law do not withstand
scrutiny").
"1 See Julie A. Veach, Note, On Considering the Public Interest in Bankruptcy:' Looking to the Railroads
for Answers, 72 IND. LJ. 1211, 1220 (1997) (noting that of the twenty-eight large railroads that filed
petitions under the old railroad reorganization provisions between 1933 and 1940, none completed its
reorganization during that time).
12
See, e.g., 29 U.S.C. § 2102 (1994) (requiring employers to give sixty days notice prior to closing a
plant, but not otherwise restricting their freedom to do so).
3
1 See 11 U.S.C. § 507 (1994) (listing, exclusively, only nine types of unsecured claims with priority
status); id. § 523 (1994 & Supp. 1997) (listing, exclusively, only eighteen debts that are exempt from
discharge).
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asserting rights as "communities" would not be "substantially injured" by the
Chapter 11 case or that their grievances are not "redressable" there. If either
of those conditions is met, there is no right in the community to take part in
the Chapter 11. Since neither of those conditions is defined in Professor
Gross' proposal it is likely that some bankruptcy judges would make them
high barriers for communities to participate in a Chapter 11 case.
Second is the opposite possibility, that bankruptcy judges enamored of
Professor Gross' ideas14 would construe "substantial injury" as broadly as
suggested in her book and would concede that almost everything is
"redressable" in Chapter 11. Before such a judge proceedings in a Chapter 11
case could take on the appearance of a utility rate hearing in which every
conceivable representative of the public, consumers and businesses alike,
would be welcome participants. That sort of hearing, of course, would be an
indeterminate mess. Without standards, the judge would have to reconcile
the rights of unsecured creditors, secured creditors, the Sierra Club, unions
and, possibly, customers. Some of these parties would align with one another,
but in most circumstances the negotiations would be multi-lateral-many different parties pulling in many different directions. To have so many participants with stakes that are so uncertain and with rights that are ill-defined
attempting to take part in the process of running the company while it is in
Chapter 11 and devising a Chapter 11 exit plan can only cause confusion and
uncertainty and bring delay and expense. I would predict that few judges
would welcome new, vocal and officious "communities" into their courtrooms
and that insubstantial change in the status quo would be most likely. Some
bankruptcy judges may believe that customers, unions, taxpayers, taxing authorities and the like should have a larger say in major Chapter 11 cases, and
I suspect that some judges, at least initially, would interpret Professor Gross'
rules to allow extensive intervention by "communities." Even those who issued a broad invitation initially would tire of the experience. Of course, a
judge's reputation for free invitation of "communities" would insure that no
1
major Chapter 11 cases would be filed in his or her district. Consider some of the probable consequences of and practical difficulties
with Professor Gross' proposals. Although she suggests that only § 1129
would have to be modified to allow participation by these communities in a
1

'4See, e.g., In re Bruzzese, 214 B.R. 444, 447 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1997) (Bernstein, J.) (characterizing
Professor Gross as one of several "imaginative and resourceful scholars" currently addressing bankruptcy
issues).
15See 28 U.S.C. § 1408 (1994) (governing venue in bankruptcy cases); DAVID G. EPSTEIN ET AL.,
BANKRUPTCY 876 (1993) ("[V]irtually every major reorganization case presents several venue options,

and that a significant amount of 'forum shopping' goes oh in selecting the district in which to file the
petition").
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Chapter 11,16 surely other sections would have to be added to that list and
communities' participation would have to be expanded. Assume a manufacturer in Chapter 11 wants to close a plant, discharge its workers, and move
its operations from one city to another. Assume further that the local union,
the city and other tax collecting agencies are opposed to the closing. If each
of those interested parties could appear and oppose the closure only as part of
the negotiation of the plan of reorganization under § 1129, the obvious solution for the debtor is to foreclose any § 1129 debate by closing the plant
under the authority of § 363, with court approval but without the interference of the "communities" who would be invited to take part in the § 1129
process.' 7 Of course, as the example suggests, if Professor Gross' proposal
makes sense for § 1129, it also makes sense for similar decisions under § 363.
Therefore Professor Gross' simple suggestion that we invite the communities
into the plan negotiation process under § 1129 really means that we must
invite the communities into earlier transactions-for fear that those transactions will foreclose any possibility of the community's involvement in preparation and negotiation of the plan. So the starting point of her simple plan
will not work. We will have to invite the communities in early to take part
in any § 363 decisions and possibly any decisions under § 364; conceivably
they should have a say even in automatic stay decisions under § 362. That,
of course, means that her proposal brings interference not merely to the negotiation of the plan, but interference at every stage of the Chapter 11 case
from its beginning to its end.
A second consequence of Professor Gross' proposal'is that creditors and
debtors will appear in "community" clothing. One can easily imagine an unsecured creditor or a deeply insolvent debtor who will be paid nothing on
liquidation inviting the taxing authorities and the Chamber of Commerce to
make his arguments. These guests will claim to be self-interested communities when in fact they will be singing lyrics written by the creditor's lawyer.
These disingenuous expressions of interest by "communities" might be the
16See
7

GRoss, supra note 1, at 228, 248.

' See 11 U.S.C. § 363 (1994); Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors of LTV Aerospace and Defense
Co. v. LTV Corp. (In re Chateaugay Corp.), 973 F.2d 141 (2nd Cir. 1992); Stephens Indus., Inc. v.
McClung, 789 F.2d 386 (6th Cir. 1986); Committee of Equity Security Holders v. Lionel Corp. (In re
Lionel Corp.), 722 F.2d 1063 (2d Cir. 1983); In re Lady H. Coal Co., 193 B.R. 233 (Bankr. S.D. W.Va.
1996); In re Whet, Inc., 12 B.RI 743 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1981) (all of these cases allow sale of all or a
substantial part of debtors' assets under § 363). See also 1 COLLIER BANKRUPTCY MANUAL (MB)
§ 363.10 (3rd ed. Rev. 1997) ('It is now generally accepted that section 363 allows such sales in Chapter
11, provided, however, that the sale proponent demonstrates a good, sound business justification for conducting the sale prior to confirmation (other than appeasement of the loudest creditor, that there has been
adequate and reasonable notice of the sale, that the sale is proposed in good faith, and that the purchase
price is fair and reasonable"); DAVID G. EPsE ET AL., BANKRUPTCY 180 (1993) (363(b) authorizes the
sale of all or substantially all of the assets of a company in Chapter 11, even though there is no finding of
actual emergency").
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most dramatic consequence of Professor Gross' proposals. Creditors or the
debtor will thus seek to elevate their own arguments by making those arguments appear to be the arguments of the taxing authorities, the Chamber of
Commerce, citizens or the like. If I am correct, most communities, such as the
a mayor or citizens, will merely be making arguments that already have been
made by creditors, the debtor or others in the process. To the extent they
add nothing to the arguments but cost time and cause delays, they are dead
weight.
A third costly sideshow certain to follow Professor Gross' community
proposals might be called equal protection litigation. Assume, for example,
that the airline that services Blytheville, Arkansas, goes into Chapter 11.
Assume further that the bankruptcy court recognizes a citizen group, "Citizens for Flight," to appear as a "community" on behalf of the debtor's attempt
to reorganize. What if the "Arkansas Community Bussing Association," an
organization whose members will gain revenue and business if the airline fails,
seeks to intervene? If the court accepts one advocate and rejects the other, it
will surely be challenged for discriminatory application of the standards.
That of course is new, inevitable litigation that will arise in any significant
Chapter 11 case where there are conflicting interests among those who technically are not creditors.
Perhaps the most significant difficulty with Professor Gross' proposed
community rules has been well explained by Bankruptcy Judge Barry S. Shermer: the absence of a medium of exchange between creditors on the one hand
and "communities" on the other.18 Current Chapter 11 law and the rules
published under it have explicit statements of the voting rights and relative
priorities of various parties. These provisions and the decisions under them
give parties a reasonable basis to determine the class into which they will be
placed and the nature of their rights in the reorganization proceedings. For
example, creditors know that if they make up more than one half in number
or two thirds in dollars, they can vote the decision of the class into which
they are inserted. 19 They know also that they will be protected against inappropriate inclusion in the wrong class and that a vote of at least one class will
20
be necessary for the plan's approval over the objection of other classes.
They know that their claims will prime the shareholders' rights but lose to
more senior secured creditors' claims. 21 Professor Gross makes no provision
to grant votes to her communities nor to include them in any class. She does
not specify any other way how communities are to exert their influence in
"SSee Barry S. Schermer, Response to Professor Gross: Taing the Interests of the Community Into
Account in Bankruptcy-A Modern-Day Tale of Belling the Cat, 72 WASH. U. L.Q. 1049, 1051 (1994).

'9See 11 U.S.C. § 1126(c) (1994).

2

See id. § 1129(a)(10).
"1See id. § 1129(b)(2).
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any case in which there is disagreement among the debtor, creditors and
communities. How is one to determine their rights and to resolve conflicts
between a community and the controlling creditors or the debtor?
Assume, for example, a tannery in Chapter 11 that has been a long-term
polluter. Assume also that the debtor and most of the creditors are interested in a reorganization but the citizens of the community, represented perhaps by the Sierra Club, would like the tannery closed and its assets devoted
to an environmental cleanup. How is the court to equilibrate the interests of
the citizens with the interests of the creditors and the debtor? Would the
Sierra Club be treated as a class that could vote against the plan but would
be unable by itself to stop a confirmation in most circumstances? If so, what
are those rights? Or does the judge, if persuaded by the Sierra Club, simply
rule that it would be better that the tannery go away? One can foresee
lawless decisions that are bound only by the judge's whim. In her proposal,
Professor Gross gives the judge no principled way to decide the weight to be
given to a particular community's claim. 22 If the judge is an environmentalist,
the tannery dies; if the judge is an environmental skeptic, the tannery lives;
and if the judge is both an environmentalist and a union sympathizer, the case
23
drags on without resolution.
One should understand a probable, though not certain, consequence of
Professor Gross' rules. Almost all of her examples involve "communities"
such as taxing authorities, 24 customers of airlines 25 and patients at hospitals.26 Almost all of her exemplars would favor the reorganization of the
debtor and oppose the debtor's liquidation. If her vision is accurate, the
adoption of her proposal would further exacerbate the "type I" error that is
now widely made. According to Professor Michelle White, a type I error is
one in which a business that would be better off dead is kept alive a longer
period than it should be.27 Professor White's assertion is that the Chapter
11 system often errs on one side or the other, namely that it kills businesses
that should be kept alive and keeps alive businesses that should be killed. If
we now err by keeping too many businesses alive for too long and if Professor
Gross is correct in her assumption that the principal "communities" will push
for reorganization, it will mean businesses that should be killed will be kept
alive yet longer than is currently the case. If she is correct about what will
22

See GRoss, supra note 1, at 215-19.

23

Cf. idat 227 CIf community is to be recognized, some specific amendments to the Code are
needed.").
24
See id. at 153-55.
See id. at 212-14.
26
See id. at 221-23.
25

27 Michelle J. White, Does Chapter 11 Save Economically Inefficient Finns?,72 WASH. U. L.Q. 1319
(1994).
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happen and I am correct in concluding that Chapter 11 routinely prolongs
the life of dying businesses, 28 adoption of her community proposal will enlarge existing waste.
There may be some other thorns among Professor Gross' roses. For example, it is plausible that citizens would prefer to see a polluting tannery go
out of business, that the operators of and patrons at one struggling hospital
would like to see the cross- town hospital liquidated, and that the owners
and patrons of a small, local grocery store would like to see the Safeway go
out of business. In those cases the communities would appear and opt for
liquidation, not for reorganization. I wonder if that is what Professor Gross
has in mind.
I believe that inviting guests to Chapter 11 cases and proceedings, guests
who do not vote, do not pay, and do not benefit or suffer directly, is not wise.
I believe Professor Gross' proposal would increase the cost and change the
outcome in Chapter 11 in ways that cannot be fully predicted. It probably
would prolong the deathroes of companies that should liquidate and would
waste money that could otherwise go to creditors. Conceivably it would turn
Chapter 11 proceedings into grand circuses with multiple interests speaking
with many tongues. Most likely it will merely increase the cost of Chapter
11 and decrease the certainty of that outcome. By doing so it will of course
raise the cost of credit by some increment and cause creditors to look for
ways, necessarily inefficient, to insulate themselves from the effects of Professor Gross' proposal.
II. SPECIAL PRIORITY FOR CREDITORS SUFFERING
"IRREPARABLE INJURY"
Professor Gross' second radical suggestion is to grant special priority to
unsecured creditors in bankruptcy who can show that the standard pro rata
distribution will cause them "irreparable injury."29 She gives an example of
irreparable injury that might result from a creditor's failure to be paid when
its debtor goes into bankruptcy: "a mortgage foreclosure on the creditor's
home or inability [of the creditor] to acquire needed medical care." 30 Why
one would ever apply such a rule of special priority and how one would
justify it as applied to one among several identically situated creditors is beyond my understanding. As Professor Gross points out, the Bankruptcy
Code now draws distinctions among classes of creditors.3 1 This discrimina2
See
29

James J. White, Harvey's Silence, 69 AM. BANKR. L.J. 467, 476 (1995).
GROSS, supra note 1, at 165 ([A] creditor could rebut the presumption of equal treatment upon a

showing of irreparable injury. A rebuttal would then enable the creditor to recover based on equality of
outcome
rather than equality of treatment").
30
1d.
31
See id. at 145 ("Certain groups of creditors are accorded priority over the otherse).
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tion, of course, is based upon the difference in the status of those classes of
creditors, not upon differing needs of creditors within the same status. For
example, the claims of those injured by drunk drivers,32 the claims of taxing
authorities 33 and the claims of people who lend money after the petition has
been filed 34 all get special treatment vis-a-vis others who have lent money on
an unsecured basis prior to the petition's filing.
Should she argue that a particular class that is different from other classes
deserves special treatment (for example, that person who has suffered personal injury should be paid first), her argument would be difficult to refute.
One would have to do the kind of balancing that Congress did when it first
adopted the current Bankruptcy Code in 1978.3- Certainly it would not
have been crazy for Congress to have given all or some set of tort claimants
priority over other unsecured claims.3 6 The Congress chose not to do that,
and I do not interpret Professor Gross as doing it either.3 7 Her rule would
apply to a trade creditor with limited capital that had made exactly the same
loan to the debtor as a larger supplier. Assume for example that Exxon had
sold jet fuel to a failed airline and had not been paid. Assume a smaller company had done the same and had not been paid. According to Professor
Gross, the smaller company, but never Exxon, might get higher priority in the
bankruptcy than other unsecured creditors if it could show that failure to
receive payment would cause it, the smaller creditor, to fail. Even the most
liberal advocates of the new code in 1978 did not have the chutzpah to justify discrimination among creditors based on certain creditor's needs as opposed to their deserts. Professor Gross does and has.
Worse, her examples show that her "irreparable injury" does not consist
solely of economic necessity; it would have a moral component as well.3 8 For
example, if our trade creditor had gotten where he was by losing company
money at the gambling tables, his injury might not be treated as irreparable,
for, as a spendthrift, he would not be deserving. Consider Professor Gross'
example:
Suppose four creditors each lent Smythe one thousand dol32

See 11 U.s.C. § 523(a)(9) (1994) (making debts arising from drunk driving accidents nondischargeable).
33See id. § 507(a)(8) (giving priority to tax authorities); id. § 523(a)(1) (making debts arising from
unpaid
taxes nondischargeable).
34
See id. § 364 (describing varying degrees of priority for post petition lenders).
3511 U.S.C. §§ 101 et seq. (1978).
3sSee generally Lynn M. LoPucki, The Unsecured Creditor'sBargain, 80 VA. L. Rev. 1887, 1896-1916
(1994) (arguing for priority for involuntary creditors).
"7If she is less honest than I take her to be she might visualize persons who have suffered personal
injuries to be the principal beneficiaries of her unequal distribution rule, but she does not say that and does
not use tort claimants as her example.
3SGeoss, supra note 1, at 166.
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lars. They all seek to rebut the presumption. First Creditor,
a good friend, wants to be repaid so she can buy luxury
goods for herself. Had she not lent Smythe the money (or
had she been repaid), she would have been able to make such
purchases, having saved and invested prudently. Second
Creditor is Smythe's next door neighbor. Since the loan, her
spouse has become very ill, and without obtaining repayment
or taking out a home equity loan, she cannot put food on the
table. Third Creditor is Smythe's co-worker. A profligate
spender, he needs to be repaid so he can pay his own rent
because he has no savings. Fourth Creditor is a finance company that had mailed Smythe a credit application, which is
subsequently approved without much investigation.
Third Creditor may be the most needy (he could be rendered homeless), but he did contribute to his own downfall.
First Creditor is among the least needy but, unlike Fourth
Creditor, did behave in a prudent manner that will go unrewarded-a particularly troubling result if the improvident
Third Creditor recovers and she does not. Second Creditor,
who could not control her situation, needs food as distinguished from shelter. Although she could obtain a home equity loan to tide her over, such a loan would increase her
obligations; she would be out of pocket by two thousand
dollars, not just one thousand dollars. Fourth Creditor has
little going for it; it is in the business of lending and chose
not to investigate Smythe's application (perhaps in exchange
for a higher interest rate). Distinguishing among these creditors is hard and can be done only through a subjective assessment. With that caveat, an argument can be proffered that
only Second Creditor and Third Creditor will suffer irreparable harm if they are not repaid. Although one may not feel
badly for Fourth Creditor, First Creditor evokes sympathy-but not enough to rebut the presumption. If a court
allows too many rebuttals, there may not be enough money
to go around. This is a realistic concern. Being a rebutting
creditor does not guarantee payment; instead, it guarantees
an order of payment if funds are sufficient. If there is a
shortfall, the available amount is divided pro rata among the
successfully rebutting creditors, which is a return to the
3
very approach we are avoiding. 9
39

1d. at 165-66.
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The rights of her creditors are not dependent merely upon their economic
situation but also upon "sympathy" and diligence. The first creditor does not
evoke sufficient sympathy because she wants to buy "luxury goods." The
fourth is eliminated from high priority not only because it is a "finance company" but also because it lacks diligence, having granted a loan "without
much investigation." Finally, creditor three is on the cusp; that creditor may
"lose his house" (evoking sympathy), but his problems result in part because
he is a "profligate spender" (not evoking sympathy).
Although her explicit legal standard of irreparable harm says nothing
about moral justification, each of her examples is engorged with moral judgment. To say that some creditors who share identical economic circumstances are preferred over the others because one was wasteful and the other
was frugal is a foolish step beyond the dubious suggestion that a court should
take account of the wealth of the various creditors in discriminating among
them.
Consider some drastic possibilities that her proposal for favoritism might
produce. Assume that some significant part of the bankruptcy bench accepts
her invitation and embraces proposals for priority treatment on the grounds
of irreparable injury. Assume each of three women has had a breast implant
and has a claim against Dow Corning. The first, who has little money, got
the breast implant in reconstructive surgery following breast cancer. The
second has full insurance coverage, has had her implants removed at the cost
of the insurance company and has even recovered insurance payments for her
pain and suffering. The third woman had a breast implant not because she
had cancer but because she thought it would enhance her future as a dancer
in Las Vegas where she works in a chorus line. She is comparatively well-off
but is now suffering some of the symptoms of the disease claimed to be
caused by the implant.
Has any, or all, of these women suffered "irreparable injury"? Clearly, the
first makes the grade. She is poor, she has suffered injury as a result of cancer,
and she appears otherwise to be an exemplary person-thrifty but unlucky.
The second is an easy loser. Her claim is now asserted by an insurance company, a wealthy pariah, which is incapable of engendering "sympathy." It
loses. The third candidate also loses. She is condemned not only by her
wealth, which was earned without admirable thrift, but also because she is
engaged in morally reprehensible conduct and has made the particularly foolish decision to enhance her capacity to engage in that conduct by having a
breast implant. Never mind that each of these persons has an identical claim
against the debtor. Never mind that the insurance company's incentive to
settle cases in the future will be influenced by a rejection of its rights as an
assignee or subrogee. And never mind that another judge might regard the
chorus girl's behavior as an admirable exercise of her own freedom to do what
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she pleases. Two fail and one succeeds. Except in contested divorces where
someone must decide who gets custody of which children and control of
what property, I know of no cases where we grant such grand discretion to
judges to redistribute wealth based upon ad hoc judgments about the parties'
status, behavior and moral flavor. Granting such discretion to judges unnecessarily seems intuitively wrong to me. In practice, it might seem like a bad
idea even to Professor Gross.
Strategic behavior by creditors would surely follow from widespread application of Professor Gross' irreparable injury suggestion. First, of course,
professional lenders and trade creditors would raise their prices, or reduce the
amount of credit they would grant, by some increment to offset the cost and
uncertainty. Again, the predictability of outcome under the Bankruptcy
Code is diminished. Conceivably, professional lenders and sophisticated trade
creditors might try to limit claims for priority by encouraging their debtors
to deal only with trade creditors and others with a net worth high enough to
keep them from being appealing beneficiaries for redistribution of others'
wealth.
Her proposal would surely carry festering litigation in its trail. With
such open-ended invitations for judges to indulge their biases, I cannot imagine that case law could establish standards from which one could reasonably
predict outcomes without hundreds, perhaps thousands of cases, stretching
beyond the middle of the twenty-first century.
By establishing different rules in bankruptcy than exist outside, her proposal would exacerbate an existing difficulty of Chapter 11. Professors Baird
and Jackson long ago warned of the costs in having one set of rules outside of
bankruptcy and another set within.40 If a creditor's or a debtor's rights are
greater in one regime than the other, the creditor or debtor has an incentive
to move from one regime to the other-even when the movement might be
costly to the debtor and to the creditors taken as a whole. Particularly if the
irreparable injury rule were applied to large classes such as tort plaintiffs,
there is a real possibility that creditors could and would put the debtor into
bankruptcy involuntarily, even when bankruptcy would cause a net loss to
all.
Other strategic behavior might include a creditor's purchase of the claims
with special priority potential. Of course Professor Gross' rules would increase the cost of those claims, but it still might be in general creditors' interests to make those purchases.
These practical objections to Professor Gross' irreparable injury proposals
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are insignificant in comparison to the moral objections one might make. Since
bankruptcy is usually a zero sum game, where more for me is less for you, her
proposals are worse than misguided generosity. The proposal to take from
rich creditors and give to poor creditors, despite the fact that each holds
identical claims, is fundamentally an immoral attempt to take the wealth of
one and give it to another simply because the former is wealthy and the latter
is poor. If the creditor who will suffer irreparable harm by its failure to be
paid deserves to be subsidized, I know of no moral justification that requires
other creditors to provide that subsidy. What did the rich creditors do to
deserve such a burden? If there is a justification for such a subsidy, the subsidy should be provided by the taxpayers, not by other creditors who happen
to have made the same mistake as the subsidized creditor. Even if one ignores
the cost of bankruptcy litigation that would surely follow such proposals and
even if one disregards the perverse incentive that it gives to a trade creditor
who might enjoy the added priority, Professor Gross proposal should be rejected as unfair. It is unfair to subject wealthy creditors to the whims of
judges who must act without guidance, and it is unfair to take the money of
one and give it to another only because the former happens to be near at hand
while both have made the same bad judgment about the debtor's capacity to
pay.
CONCLUSION
With any luck, Professor Gross' proposals in Failure and Forgiveness will
enjoy no more acceptance than Tom Hayden's. Chapter 11 needs change, but
not the changes suggested by Professor Gross.
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